

Network Fingerprinting: TTL-based Router Signatures

Yves VANAUBEL¹, Jean-Jacques PANSIOT², Pascal MERINDOL²
and Benoit DONNET¹

¹ULg (Belgium), ²UDS (France)



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Summary

- ▶ Motivations
- ▶ TTL-based router signatures
- ▶ Measurement campaign
- ▶ Signatures distribution and consistency
- ▶ Use cases
- ▶ Conclusions

Motivations

Network fingerprinting

Action of grouping network devices into (disjoint) classes.
Equivalent to `nmap` but for routers instead of host OSes.


Signature

Set of information collected thanks to the fingerprinting.

- ▶ Understanding the characteristics of the Internet:
 - ▶ hardware distribution (CISCO, Juniper, etc.)
 - ▶ routing operating systems distribution (IOS, OS-XR, JUNOS, JUNOSE, etc.)
 - ▶ abnormal behaviors
 - ▶ vulnerabilities
 - ▶ ...
- ▶ Topology discovery
- ▶ ...

Time To Live (TTL)

- ▶ Field in the IP header (avoid routing loops)
- ▶ Maximum number of hops for an IP packet



TTL - Initial Value

- ▶ Should be initialized to 64 (RFC 1700)
- ▶ However, in practice, the initial value of the TTL (*iTTL*) may depend on:
 - ▶ the hardware (CISCO, Juniper, ...)
 - ▶ the operating system
 - ▶ the protocol used for the message (ICMP, UDP, ...)
 - ▶ the type of the message (information packets versus errors)

Idea:

Solicit routers with several probes in order to receive n different types of (ICMP) replies, infer their initial TTL value and derive a signature of the type

$$\langle iTTL_1, iTTL_2, iTTL_3, \dots, iTTL_n \rangle$$

ICMP Messages

- ▶ We consider three types of ICMP messages:
 1. **Time-exceeded** messages (obtained with `traceroute`)
 2. **Echo-reply** messages (obtained with `ping`)
 3. **Destination-unreachable** messages (obtained with UDP probes sent to a very high destination port)
- ▶ Marginal gain with **destination-unreachable** messages
- ▶ Initial values of TTLs used by nodes: 32, 64, 128, 255

Initial TTL Value: Inference

Initial TTL inference:

Smallest integer in {32, 64, 128, 255} larger than the received value


In the example:

- ▶ 63 in the TTL field of the ICMP response
- ▶ 64 is the corresponding inferred iTTL

Measurement Campaign

- ▶ Measurement campaign on the PlanetLab platform
- ▶ 1M of destinations from CAIDA data
- ▶ 200 vantage points (VP), i.e. 5000 destinations/VP
- ▶ Each IP on a trace pinged 6 times
- ▶ Scamper with paris-traceroute
- ▶ About 8h of probing per VP
- ▶ About 3 days of campaign due to the PlanetLab instabilities
- ▶ 335,646 unique IPs collected with 13,437,896 traceroute replies
- ▶ Marginal probing cost overhead (14,803,614 ping replies)

Initial TTL Value: Distribution



Generic Router Signature Construction Algorithm

- ▶ For each destination:
 1. Send **traceroute** probes to detect the nodes on the path
 2. Foreach received **ICMP time-exceeded** message:
 - ▶ Check if the corresponding node was not already probed
 - ▶ Infer the first iTTL of the signature
 - ▶ Send other types of probes (**Ping**, **UDP**, ...)
 - ▶ Infer the other iTTLs based on the responses

TTL-based Router Signatures

- ▶ Consists in a n-tuple of initial TTL
- ▶ As a first try, $n = 2$ (marginal gain with UDP probes):

<**Time-exceeded, Echo-reply**>

- ▶ Signature diversity: in theory up to $4 \times 5^{n-1}$, n : # probes
- ▶ The symbol * means an absence of iTTL (no answer to the corresponding probe). The signature is **incomplete**
- ▶ Examples : <255-255>, <255-*>, <255-128>, ...

Signatures Consistency

Assumption:

The signature associated to a given IP address is unique

- ▶ Considering only IP addresses probed by at least two VPs...
- ▶ ... a signature may be (for a given IP address):
 - ▶ **Coherent**: signatures always the same (in 95.92%)
 - ▶ **Weakly incoherent**: signatures sometimes complete, but also sometimes incomplete (in 4.94%) (e.g. <255-255> and <255-*>)
 - ▶ **Incoherent**: complete signatures but different (in 0.14%)


Signatures Consistency

- ▶ In the vast majority, coherent signatures.
- ▶ Causes of the (rare) inconsistency:
 - ▶ our initial TTL inference?
 - ▶ anycast?
 - ▶ middleboxes?
- ▶ Possibility to complete weakly incoherent signatures (e.g. $\langle 255-* \rangle \Rightarrow \langle 255-255 \rangle$)

\Rightarrow Our assumption is correct:

The signature associated to a given IP address is **unique**


Signatures Distribution



Cisco	<255-255>
Juniper (Junos)	<255-64>
Juniper (JunosE)	<128-128>
Brocade, Alcatel and Linux boxes	<64-64>

Table : Some router manufacturer mapping examples

MPLS Repartition: Global TTL-overview



- ▶ Donnet et al.: “Revealing MPLS tunnels obscured from traceroute” ACM SIGCOMM CCR, 2012.
- ▶ The increase of Juniper routers seems significant
- ▶ Decrease of signature <64-64>
- ▶ Decrease of signature <255-255> while <255-*> and <255-64> increase their share


Use Cases

- ▶ (In)validation of measurement hypotheses (e.g. MPLS tunnels discovery)
- ▶ Helping alias resolution (clustering approach)
- ▶ ...


Conclusion

- ▶ Each IP (router?) has a unique TTL-based fingerprint
- ▶ The distribution of signatures is already valuable with 2 iTTLs
- ▶ Work still in progress: refine the signatures distribution
- ▶ Help alias resolution and so IP network mapping
- ▶ Help to improve any active probing methods and analysis such as MPLS discovery and quantification


MPLS Tunnels: Taxonomy



MPLS Tunnels: Proportion



MPLS Tunnels: Signatures



Implicit MPLS Tunnels: Signatures

